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WORLDTRADE
US–COOL: How the Appellate Body
Misconstrued the National Treatment Principle,
Severely Restricting Agency Discretion to
Promulgate Mandatory, Pro-Consumer
Labeling Rules
Juscelino F. COLARES* & William P. CANTERBERRY*
In United States–Certain Country of Origin Labeling Requirements1the Appellate Body
(AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled that the United States’ country-of-origin
labeling regulations (COOL) on beef and pork products violated the Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade’s (TBT) National Treatment (NT) Principle.2 Aimed at promoting informed consumer
choice, COOL required retailers to disclose the covered products’ origin. In prior decisions under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article III:4, the AB correctly rejected protectionist
rules that unnecessarily encumbered consumer choice, while adversely affecting conditions of competition
for imports. InUS–COOL, however, the AB formalistically transposed such GATT jurisprudence
into TBT analysis, equating private action in compliance with neutral, transparency-promoting
labeling rules to private action in compliance with capricious, opacity-inducing distribution rules.
This article argues that, while GATT NT-jurisprudence should enlighten analysis under the TBT,
WTO adjudicators should not allow exporting Members’ perceived entitlement to trade volumes –
which may well be premised on continued opacity and uninformed consumer choice – to interfere with
importing Members’ origin-neutral regulations. (JEL: F13, F53, K23, K41, Q13, Q17).
1 INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, US law excluded products like beef and pork from COOL
requirements.3 In 2002, the US Congress ended this carve-out in a farm
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Consumer Labeling Rules’. Journal of World Trade 51, no. 1 (2017): 105–130.
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1 Appellate Body Report, United States–Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) Requirements, WT/
DS384/AB/R, WT/DS386/AB/R (adopted 29 June 2012) [hereinafter US–COOL].
2 Ibid., at ¶ 496.
3 See Tariff Act of 1930, Ch. 497, Title III, Part I, § 304,46 Stat. 687 (1930); Ch. 679, § 3, 52 Stat. 1077
(1938); Ch. 397, § 4(c), 67 Stat. 509 (1953); Pub.L. No. 98-573, Title II, Subtitle A, § 207, 98 Stat.
2976 (1984); Pub.L. No. 99-514, Title XVIII, Subtitle B, Ch. 3, § 1888(1), 100 Stat. 2924 (1986);
Pub. L. No. 100-418, Title I, Subtitle H, Part 1, § 1907(a)(1), 102 Stat. 1314 (1988); Pub. L. No. 103-
182, Title II, § 207(a), 107 Stat. 2096 (1993); Pub. L. No. 104-295, § 14(a), (b), 110 Stat. 3521 (1996);
bill.4 The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) would publish final labeling
standards on 15 January 2009,5 following a long notice-and-comment period
that resulted in amendments to the original Farm Bill.6 The new regulation –
henceforth referred to as COOL – mandated retailers to identify beef and pork
product origin according to where certain steps of production took place.7
COOL required that meat be labelled in one of four categories: wholly US
origin; mixed origin; imported for immediate slaughter; and wholly foreign.8
These requirements met with immediate resistance from importers of livestock
and the highly concentrated US meatpacking industry,9 who filed an unsuc-
cessful First Amendment, commercial speech suit in federal court with the
support of foreign livestock-producer trade associations and governments
(Canada and Mexico).10 Before that, however, the latter, reportedly, in coor-
dination with US meatpackers ‘use[d] the WTO process as an end-run around
a domestic debate’.11 This became the six-year US–COOL dispute.
Canada and Mexico (‘Complainants’) challenged the Interim COOL measure
before a WTO panel12 under the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)13 and
GATT.14 They claimed the measure violated TBT Article 2.1 and GATT
Article III:4 because it altered the conditions of competition to the detriment of
Pub.L. No. 106-36, Title II, Subtitle B, § 2423(a), (b), 113 Stat. 180 (1999) (currently codified at 19
U.S.C. §1304(3)(J) (excepting COOL requirements for products not covered by the original Tariff
Act of 1930, including beef and pork products).
4 See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, P.L. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134, 533–535 (2002)
(requiring imported and domestic products to bear their country of origin information) [the ‘Farm Bill
of 2002’ or ‘original Farm Bill’].
5 See Final Rule on Mandatory COOL of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, Wild and Farm-
Raised Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and
Macadamia Nuts, 74 Fed. Reg. 2,658-2,707 (15 Jan. 2009) [hereinafter ‘Final Rule’] (codified at 7
C.F.R. pt. 65, § 65.300–500 (2009)).
6 See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. 110–234, 122 Stat. 923, 1351–1354 (2008) [the
Farm Bill of 2008’ or ‘amended Farm Bill’], 7 U.S.C. §§ 1638-38d (2008).
7 See 7 C.F.R. 65, § 65.300(d)–(f).
8 See ibid.
9 See Llewellyn Hinkes-Jones, Meatpackers Struggle to Sell Import-Labeled Beef, Bloomberg BNA
WTO Rep. 1 (2 Feb. 2016) (quoting an industry expert comment that ‘four companies – Cargill
Inc., Tyson Food Inc., JBS SA, and National Beef Packing Co. LLC – control 80% of the
market’.) [hereinafter ‘Hinkes-Jones’], http://news.bna.com/wtln/WTLNWB/split_display.adp?
fedfid=82512206&vname=wtobulallissues&wsn=493831500&searchid=29135203&doctypei-
d=1&type=date&mode=doc&split=0&scm=WTLNWB&pg=0 (last visited 11 Jan. 2017).
10 See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F. 3d 18, 19 (DC Cir. 2014). The governments of
Canada and Mexico filed amici briefs before the DC Circuit. See ibid.
11 See Hinkes-Jones, supra n. 9, at 1 (quoting Food & Water Watch expert).
12 See Panel Report, United States–Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/
Panel/R, WT/DS386/Panel/R (18 Nov. 2011) [hereinafter US–COOL (Panel)].
13 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Art. 2.1, 15 Apr. 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, [hereinafter TBT]; General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Art. 3.4, 15 Apr. 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT Art. III:4].
14 GATT Art. III:4.
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foreign producers, thereby affording an unfair advantage to domestic industry.15
The United States responded by challenging the alleged causal relationship
between COOL and the disparate impact on foreign producers. It maintained
that private actor response to market circumstances accounted for any additional,
incidental costs to foreign livestock, not COOL itself.
The panel agreed with Complainants that COOL, as implemented by the
domestic industry, disparately affected foreign producers by imposing greater
compliance costs, which it deemed unfair.16 The Appellate Body (AB) affirmed,
ruling that COOL affected the conditions of competition to the detriment of
foreign producers and, as such, was discriminatory.17 Both panel and AB declined
to consider Complainants’ GATT claims because any finding under TBT Article
2.1 was sufficient to dispose of the case in favour of Complainants.18
This article makes two basic arguments. First, AB’s National Treatment (NT)-
analysis under TBT 2.1 misattributed to COOL the results of market-driven
processes responsible for punctual, disparate impacts on foreign meat products.
Structural market conditions and greater US consumer preference for domestic
product accounted for the loss of the foreign product’s appeal to US meatpackers.
Thus, US–COOL represents a departure from prior WTO rulings not only
because it unjustifiably imputed the incidental impact of private actors’ compliance
decisions to a Respondent, but because it also ignored contemporaneous market
trends that had a much larger role in influencing importing industry preferences
and, thus, import volumes. Second, this article argues that the AB’s discrimination
analysis is flawed because it never demonstrated how any ‘disparate impact’ to
imported livestock could be attributed to their foreignness. Prior in-point GATT/
TBT jurisprudence had established the principle that, to find discrimination, one
must find more than a burden on foreign producers. Specifically, Complainants
had to establish that any burden occurred by reason of the imported product’s
foreign origin and not some alternative, legitimate regulatory reason. In US–
COOL, however, the AB did not conduct this analysis. It focused, unjustifiably,
on what it perceived as problems with COOL’s ‘confusing’ labeling scheme, only
to then make a conclusory finding of discrimination.
15 See US–COOL (Panel), supra n. 12, at ¶¶ 7.2, 7.4. Complainants also argued COOL violated TBT Art.
2.2, because it was allegedly ineffective in attaining its stated objective: providing accurate country-of-
origin information to consumers without restricting trade more than necessary. See ibid., at ¶ 7.3. For
reasons of brevity, we shall focus only on the TBT Art. 2.1 challenge.
16 US–COOL (Panel), supra n. 12, at ¶ 7.403.
17 The AB held that the intention of a measure, or the degree of autonomy for private actors is irrelevant.
Instead, the inquiry is whether the measure adversely affects competitive opportunities to the detri-
ment of the import. See US–COOL, supra n. 1, at ¶ 288.
18 Complainants’ GATT Art. III:4 appeal was conditional upon reversal of the panel’s TBT Art. 2.1
findings. Because the AB did not overrule the panel in regards to its ruling on TBT Art. 2.1, the appeal
concerning GATT Art. III:4 was not considered. See US–COOL, supra n. 1, at ¶492–493.
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Section 1 sketches the operation of COOL from its inception, explains how
US processors complied with its requirements and makes sense of the totality of
factors shaping the US market for livestock, both before and after COOL. Section
2 provides a NT analysis under GATT Article III:4. It establishes that Korea–Beef
provided the parameters for such analysis under GATT, a framework that US–
Clove Cigarettes and US–Tuna II (Section 3) later extended to TBT Article 2.1.
Section 4 reviews the AB’s aberrant Article 2.1 analysis in US–COOL by providing
a critique that applies the then-prevailing NT analysis to the facts and legal issues of
US–COOL. Section 5 presents a brief discussion of the aftermath of US–COOL.
The article concludes by sounding the alarm on the potential impact of this
decision: henceforth, Member discretion to impose pro-consumer choice, labeling
requirements will be vehemently second-guessed by an AB that places unjustified
weight on trade effects regardless of a measure’s neutral purposes and intent.
2 INTO THE COOL
The 2008 Farm Bill amended previous legislation setting the rules for the labeling
of covered meat products’ country-of-origin information19 and laid different
standards for what products could carry the US country-of-origin label.20
Pursuant to this legislation, USDA published its final rule in 2009,21 with the
ostensible purpose of better informing consumers on the origin of covered meat
products.22
2.1 BACKGROUND
The US is one of the largest producers, consumers, importers and exporters of
beef.23 Because beef production occurs in different stages, it is also likely to occur
across national borders. For instance, Canada usually breeds and raises livestock
domestically and exports livestock for immediate slaughter to the United States.
Mexico also breeds and exports livestock to the US; Mexican livestock tend to be
exported while still young. Canada and Mexico are the top two beef and pork
exporters to the US market.24
19 2008 U.S. Farm Bill, Pub. L., 110–234, §11002, 122 Stat. 923, 471–473 (2008).
20 See ibid. (The 2008 Farm Bill differed from its successors in requiring covered products’ labels to reflect
where certain steps of production occurred, rather than merely indicating where the product was
processed [slaughtered], as had previously been the case.)
21 Final Rule, supra n. 5, at 2,658.
22 During the interim-rule-commenting period, USDA explained that, ‘[t]he intent of the statute is to
require retailers to provide specific origin information to consumers’. See ibid.
23 Oklahoma State University, Cow-Calf Corner, Why Does the US Both Import and Export Beef, BEEF (29
Sept. 2015 5:38 pm), http://beefmagazine.com/cowcalfweekly/0611-why-does-us-import-export-
beef
24 Ibid.
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US regulators adopted COOL to reflect the reality of this cross-border
activity. Before 2009, cattle imported for immediate slaughter received a ‘US
Beef’ designation, despite the fact that such cattle might have spent most their
lives outside the United States. The new regulation gave consumers relatively
more precise information about whether a particular cut of meat was domestic,
foreign or mixed-origin.25 For instance, starting in 2009, meat obtained from
Canadian-born cattle that were raised and slaughtered in the US would be labelled
‘Product of the United States and Canada.’
While seeking to provide consumers more accurate origin information,
USDA also took into account domestic importing industry’s objections regard-
ing compliance costs. To address these concerns, USDA amended its Interim
Rule in a number of significant ways.26 First, it exempted producers from
keeping additional records, so long as extant records were sufficient to identify
livestock origin.27 Second, it also gave retailers a safe-harbour: retailers did not
have to independently verify COOL information; they were allowed to rely
solely on their suppliers’ representations.28 Third, it allowed comingling meat
during processing, but required that labels list such meats’ countries of origin.29
Such flexibility did not fully satisfy the US meatpacking industry’s continued
objections, however.30
2.2 COOL OPERATION
2.2[a] The New Classification Scheme
COOL required processors and retailers to label covered products in one of
four ways.31 Although not referring expressly to category names, COOL used
exactly the same definitions contained in a separate memorandum on labeling
options, which, for purposes of clarity, the WTO adjudicators retained, and so
25 See Final Rule, supra n. 5, at 2,659.
26 These changes from the interim rule to the final rule, adjusted before the AB decision, were designed
to address importing industry concerns. See ibid., at 2,680 (‘This rule provides flexibility in how the
required country of origin information is conveyed along the supply chain, thus enabling firms to
implement the requirements with the least possible disruption to cost-efficient production methods
and trade flows’.).
27 See ibid., at 2,659.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 See, e.g., Consumer Reports–Food Safety & Sustainability Center: Beef Report7 (2015) (‘Since COOL
went into effect, those countries and trade groups representing large international beef corporations
have opposed it.’) (citation omitted) [hereinafter ‘Consumer Reports–Beef Report’], http://www.
consumerreports.org/content/dam/cro/magazine-articles/2015/October/Consumer%20Reports
%20Food%20%26%20Sustainability%20Center%20Beef%20Report_8-15.pdf
31 Final Rule, supra n. 5, at 2,659.
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do we.32 Meat received a ‘Category A’ designation if all stages of production
occurred within the United States.33 ‘Category B’ applied to meet with multi-
ple countries of origin.34 ‘Category C’ described meat coming from livestock
imported to the United States for immediate slaughter.35 Finally, ‘Category D’
meat was produced entirely outside the country.36
By itself, COOL did not seem to impose excessively burdensome record-
keeping costs.37 Some exporting countries and major domestic processing/meat-
importing groups did complain about increased compliance costs and the need to
segregate foreign livestock.38 To regulators, the added record-keeping obligations
did not differ much from business-as-usual, ordinary reporting practices.39 Experts
from watchdog organizations suggested that processors ‘already segregate[d] and
labele[d] on a number of different factors’.40 Clearly, two groups disagreed on the
effects of the measure: foreign producers, joined by domestic importers and
regulators, joined by pro-consumer groups.
2.2[b] Making Sense of Declining Livestock Market Trends, Declining Exports and New
Compliance Costs
Early scholarly work on compliance costs reached mixed results. One study
predicted US processors would be burdened because COOL imposed compliance
costs on meat processed in the US, while foreign processors would become more
competitive by virtue of not having to track country-of-origin information in their
own countries.41 Accordingly, foreign livestock producers could stand to benefit
from having their product processed abroad and then exported into the US.
A study commissioned by foreign livestock producers found that US
processors could avoid increased compliance costs only by designating themselves
32 Compare Memorandum from Agricultural and Marketing Service on Labeling Options 1, 2 (updated
20 Sept. 2013) [hereinafter ‘AMS Classification Memo’], https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/
files/media/LabelingOptions%5B1%5D.pdf with Final Rule, supra n. 5, at 2,659 with See US–COOL
(Panel), supra n. 12, at ¶ 7.89; US–COOL, supra n. 1, at ¶ 243. Incidentally, this letter-based
classification traces back to the original set-up in the authorizing statute. See 7 U.S.C. § 1638a(2)
(A)-(D) (emphasis added).
33 See 7 U.S.C. § 1638a(2)(A), AMS Classification Memo, supra n. 32, at 2.
34 See ibid., at (B).
35 See ibid., at (C).
36 See ibid., at (D).
37 While the party supplying a covered product to retailers was ultimately responsible for the accuracy of
COOL information, the statute specifically forbade the implementing regulation from requiring
record-keeping beyond that collected ‘in the normal conduct of business’. See ibid., at 2,659.
38 See Consumer Reports–Beef Report, supra n. 30, at 7.
39 See Final Rule, supra n. 5, at 2,689 (‘This adaptation generally would require relatively small marginal
costs for recordkeeping and identification systems’.).
40 See Hinkes-Jones, supra n. 9, at 3 (quoting Food & Water Watch expert).
41 See Keithly G. Jones et al., Country of Origin Labeling: Evaluating the Impacts on U.S. and World Markets,
38 Agric. & Resources Econ. Rev. 397, 401 (2009).
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as ‘US-only’ facilities, or by limiting production of foreign meat batches to certain
production days (e.g., Sundays and Thursdays).42 However, the same study
allowed the inference that US processors who produced imported meats from a
single foreign country faced costs no different than those choosing to operate as
‘US-only’ facilities.43 This study revealed that processors responding to COOL
requirements did have an incentive to source only single-country livestock (either
permanently or in certain dedicated days) to reduce record-keeping costs. It also
explained that the lower on-tap availability of foreign livestock could not meet
certain major processors’ daily demands,44 which could factor into processors’ cost
calculations.
A 2009 USDA Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration
(GIPSA) report recognized that the greater transparency promoted by COOL
and prevailing consumer perceptions were partly responsible for difficulties in
selling foreign-origin meat to country-of-origin-sensitive US consumers.45
Recent data from Statistics Canada and USDA, suggest that other variables had a
more significant role in the drop of Canadian exports than any marginal rise in
record-keeping and segregating costs.
Figure 1 shows that Canadian livestock exports had been declining at sig-
nificant rate for at least four years prior to COOL implementation.46 Such decline
seems to track Canadian producers’ decision to liquidate a significant portion of
their ‘inflated inventory following the 2003 BSE [i.e., bovine spongiform ence-
phalopathy] investigation’.47 The continued drop in Canadian exports during the
42 Informa Economics, Update of Cost Assessments for Country of Origin Labeling – Beef & Pork, 6
(2010) [hereinafter ‘Informa Economics’] (‘For a packer/processor that has made the determination to
slaughter only US cattle with their output being sold to retailers that specify only US origin beef and/
or to food service customers where origin is immaterial, the costs for the slaughter operation are
sharply reduced[.]’); Ibid., at 6–7 (explaining that facilities that do accept foreign livestock are likely to
designate specific production days or batches for foreign-origin supply).
43 See ibid., at 6 (stating that separating cattle into separate pens reduces processor costs, but that due to a
deeper discount for foreign origin products at the buyer/packer level, there would be a cost differential
between United States and foreign product).
44 See ibid., at 8.
45 See GIPSA, Investigative Report, at 248 of 348 (concluding that while producers had a justification for
discounting imported cattle, processors/packers could not explain the deep discounts for foreign cattle
other than by including lack of consumer demand of foreign beef and lower availability of foreign
product) [hereinafter ‘GIPSA Report’], http://www.usda.gov/oce///about_oce/corrective_action/
Attachment14USDAGIPSACOOLInvestigation.pdf.
46 See USDA–ERS, Cattle: Annual and Cumulative Year-to-Date U.S. Trade – All years and countries
(2015) [hereinafter ‘USDA–ERS Cattle Import Data’], http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/live
stock-meat-international-trade-data.aspx#25995. We thank BNA journalist Llewellyn Hinkes-Jones
for directing our attention to this table.
47 See Hinkes-Jones, supra n. 9, at 2.
US–COOL: HOW THE AB MISCONSTRUED NATIONAL TREATMENT 111
early implementation period (2009–2011) also coincides with the unabated reduc-
tion in the Canadian cattle herd.48
Figure 1 Canadian Beef Cattle Herd and Exports to United States (x 1,000)
Thus, the fall in Canadian exports – notably, offset by the rise in Mexican imports
during the early COOL implementation period49 – can be at least be partially
attributed to a diminished herd size. In fact, CanFax, the research arm of the
Canadian Cattlemen’s Association, reportedly stated to Bloomberg’s Bureau of
National Affairs (“BNA”) that ‘while labeling may have had an effect, the major
cause of declining Canadian cattle exports was a liquidation phase in the Canadian
48 See Statistics Canada, Cattle on Farms Table 1-1, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/23-012-x/2011002/
t001-eng.pdf. Note that, although COOL was finalized and implemented in 2009, USDA imple-
mented an interim COOL rule in 2008. See generally Interim Rule on Mandatory Country of Origin
Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, Wild and Farm-raised Fish and Shellfish,
Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and Macadamia Nuts, 73 Fed. Reg.
50,701 (9 Sept. 2008). This distinction did not seem to affect major preexisting and continuing trends
in Canadian cattle herd reduction and export decline.
49 See USDA–ERS Cattle Import Data.
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cattle cycle from 2005–2011’.50 Besides ‘an inflated inventory’ (i.e., relative to
declining demand for import-labelled beef), the report also mentions ‘a high US
dollar [and] rising feed costs’.51 A 2015 study by Farm Credit Canada, confirms the
sell-off of Canadian beef cows by mentioning the ‘glut of cattle’ resulting from the
2003 BSE events.52 According to Farm Credit Canada, Canadian livestock exports
could have scarcely been any higher in a period of significant herd liquidation:
‘Since 2009 [i.e., the initial year of the finalized COOL rule], Canada’s trade
surplus for live cattle has grown 21% to USD 1.34 billion’.53
Remarkably, higher record-keeping and segregation costs, even if significant,
appear to be dwarfed by (1) structural market conditions (e.g., lower on-tap supply
of imported livestock, substantial liquidation of Canadian inventory starting in the
pre-COOL implementation period, etc.); and (2) greater US consumer preference
for the domestic product. The GIPSA report provided detailed evidence of
processors refusing imported livestock because retailers – responding to consumer
tastes – were reducing orders of imported product.54 Indeed, greater consumer
preference for domestic beef did coincide with the implementation of COOL.
In a redacted USDA questionnaire, one US importer of Canadian livestock –
one likely not sympathetic to COOL – coyly stated: ‘he was not certain whether
US packers exploited the COOL regulations to profit from Canadian cattle
feeders’.55 He also indicated knowledge of the then-upcoming WTO ‘hearings
concerning the COOL’ and explained that the Canadian estimates of losses in the
dispute ‘were based on the USD 3/cwt [carcass-weight ton] discount’ that US
packers applied onto Canadian livestock following COOL implementation.56 In
another questionnaire, an importer of Mexican cattle candidly attributed lower
prices to (1) a smaller customer base for Category B product (i.e., comingled beef);
and (2) ‘customer demand for category B product is smaller than the available
supply of category B product produced each week’.57
50 See Hinkes-Jones, supra n. 9, at 2.
51 Ibid.
52 See Farm Credit Canada, The 2015 Beef Sector Report1, 10 (2015) [hereinafter ‘FCC AG REPORT’],
https://www.fcc-fac.ca/fcc/about-fcc/corporate-profile/reports/beef-sector/beef-sector-report-2015.
pdf.
53 See ibid., at 11.
54 See GIPSA Report, supra n. 45, at 348 of 348 (stating that ‘the number of potential customers for Label B
or C beef is shrinking, and packers represented they were unsure of the future of Label B or Label C
beef’.).
55 See GIPSA Report, supra n. 45, at 263 of 348. A cynical bystander could marvel at the sophistication of
the highly concentrated US meatpacking industry: it offset compliance costs by discounting foreign
cattle and leveraged the support of two foreign governments to eliminate an unwelcome regulation in
a more sympathetic forum (WTO-DSB) than US courts, where judges operate under firm principles
of administrative review and stare decisis.
56 See ibid.
57 See ibid., at 272 of 348.
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In light of these market-based factors, could one consider COOL discrimina-
tory merely because it marginally increased meatpackers’ compliance costs? A
rational and fair legal answer to this question requires consideration of AB analysis
of the NT-Principle (under both GATT and TBT), a discussion to which we now
turn.
3 AB’S INTERPRETATION OF THE NT-PRINCIPLE
3.1 GATT ARTICLE III:4 PROVIDES THE CONTEXT FOR NT ANALYSIS UNDER TBT
TBT Article 2.1 mandates that ‘products imported from the territory of any
Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable [(TNLF)] than that
accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating in
any other country’.58 AB rulings have equated according TNLF under TBT
Article 2.1 to according TNLF under GATT Article III:4, which applies to
internal regulations pertaining to sale, distribution, use and transportation of
imported products.59 Analysis of discrimination (i.e., not according imports
TNLF) under GATT focuses particularly on understanding a regulation’s impact
on the competitive relationship between domestic and foreign products.
Explaining the importation of this analysis to TBT Article 2.1, the AB explained:
‘a panel examining a claim of violation under article 2.1 should … ascertain
whether the technical regulation at issue modifies the conditions of competition
in the market of the regulating Member to the detriment of the group of imported
products’.60 US–COOL was supposed to be no different. Indeed, the AB
explained its purported reliance on Korea–Beef–another GATT Article III:4
case – on grounds that the NT provision in both agreements is nearly identical,
and the facts under both cases are deceptively similar.61
58 TBT Art. 2.1.
59 US–COOL,, supra n. 1, at ¶ 269 (citing Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the
Production of Clove Cigarettes, ¶¶ 100, 176–180, WT/DS406/AB/R (4 Apr. 2012) [hereinafter US–
Clove Cigarettes]; See also Appellate Body Report, United States–Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶¶ 214–215, 236–239, WT/DS381/AB/R (16 May
2012) [hereafter ‘US–Tuna II’].
60 US–Clove Cigarettes, supra n. 59, at ¶ 180.
61 See US–COOL, supra n. 1, at ¶ 288. Incidentally, the AB cited Korea–Beef fifty times in US–COOL.
As we demonstrate throughout s. 1.2 infra, future cases would refer to Korea-Beef’s GATT Art. III:4
analysis to interpret disputes arising under TBT Art. 2.1. See also US–COOL, supra n. 1, at ¶ 269 (‘The
Appellate Body recognized in US–Clove Cigarettes and US–Tuna II (Mexico) that relevant guidance for
interpreting the term ‘treatment no less favorable’ in Art. 2.1 may be found in the jurisprudence
relating to Art. III:4 of the GATT 1994’.) (citation omitted).
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3.1[a] Korea–Beef: Proving Actionable Discrimination Under GATT
3.1[a][i] The Korean Dual Retail System
In Korea–Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef,62 the AB analysed
a measure that compelled segregation of imported and domestic beef in retail
locations.63 South Korean regulations required small retailers to sell exclusively
foreign or exclusively domestic beef.64 Larger retailers could sell both domestic and
foreign beef, so long as they displayed foreign and domestic beef in separate retail
sections (i.e., not side-by-side). Facing an ‘either/or’ requirement, smaller retailers
mostly opted for the more familiar domestic product.65 Larger retailers continued to
sell foreign beef, yet consumers – unable to engage in side-by-side comparisons –
had less opportunity to take advantage of potentially less expensive beef imports. As
such, these measures caused not only a ‘dramatic reduction’ of retail outlets available
to foreign producers, but also ‘alter[ed] the conditions of competition in the Korean
market in favor of domestic beef’.66 Their purpose was not to inform consumers, but
to encumber consumer decisions by either taking away their ability to shop in
different outlets (smaller retailers), or by removing their ability to easily compare
foreign and domestic products, which, under ordinary circumstances, would be
displayed side-by-side.67 This ‘lack of equality of competitive competitions’,68 the
AB ruled, was be inconsistent with GATT Article III:4.69
3.1[a][ii] Requisite Discrimination in Korea–Beef
In Korea–Beef, the United States argued that the Korean measure impeded
imported beef from being ‘physically present with ‘like’ domestic beef at the
point of sale to the consumer’.70 The panel agreed this dual distribution system
amounted to de facto discrimination against imports ‘based exclusively on criteria
related to the origin of a product’.71 Korea challenged this determination, arguing
62 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Beef, ¶133, WT/
DS/ 171/AB/R (11 Dec. 2000) [hereinafter Korea–Beef].
63 Korea–Beef, supra n. 62, at ¶ 143 (citing Guidelines Concerning Registration and Operation of Specialized
Imported Beef Stores, (61550-81) 29 Jan. 1990, modified on 15 Mar. 1994; and the Regulations Concerning
Sales of Imported Beef (51550-100), modified on 27 Mar. 1993, 7 Apr. 1994, and 29 June 1998.)
64 Small retailers that choose to sell the imported product exclusively had to display a sign that read:
‘Specialized Imported Beef Store’. See Korea–Beef, supra n. 62, at ¶ 143.
65 See ibid., at ¶145.
66 Ibid., at ¶ 139 (referring to the panel decision, which the AB upheld).
67 Before the measure, there was a unitary distribution system where the new imported product shared
the same ‘conditions of competition’ as the domestic product. Ibid., at ¶ 145.
68 Ibid., at ¶ 145.
69 Ibid., at ¶ 148.
70 Ibid., at ¶ 50.
71 Ibid., at ¶ 130.
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that its dual retail system ‘assured[ed] perfect regulatory symmetry between imports
and domestic products[,]’ a system that offered ‘total freedom on the part of
retailers to switch from one category of shops to the other’.72
The AB agreed that the measure had created separate distribution channels on
the basis of a product’s domestic or foreign origin, but stated that was not enough
to find an Article III:4 violation.73 Before finding a violation, the AB explained,
the panel must ‘undertake[] an analysis of the market as part of an examination of
the “total configuration of the facts”’ and demonstrate ‘that the treatment thus
accorded to imported beef is less favorable than the treatment accorded to domestic
beef’.74
As far as the retail sector was concerned, the AB found that ‘limitation[s] on
the ability to compare visually two products, local and imported’75 did not, per se,
amount to the detrimental treatment proscribed under GATT Article III:4. The
AB explained that such segregation does not have ‘decisive implications for the
issue of consistency with Article III:4’, even where such measures introduce
opacity to consumer decisions.76 Such limitations could be ‘simply incidental effects
of the dual retail system’,77 a strikingly generous, if not altogether naïve assump-
tion. Clearly, when considering the upstream (distribution) and downstream
(retail) impact of segregation measures, what matters is ‘the fundamental thrust
and effect of the measure itself’,78 introduction of differential treatment alone is not
dispositive.
3.1[a][iii] The AB’s Disparate Impact Analysis in Korea–Beef
The AB then considered the causal nexus between the Korean measure and its
alleged trade effects in what we shall refer henceforth to as the ‘disparate impact’
stage of its NT analysis.79 Here, the AB set out to determine whether the dual
retail measures had modified conditions of competition to the detriment to the
imported product.80 Finding that they led to ‘the virtual exclusion of imported
beef from the retail distribution channels through which domestic beef was
distributed’, the AB held that such modification of the conditions of competition
72 Ibid., at ¶ 17.
73 Ibid., at ¶ 144.
74 Ibid., at ¶¶ 18 & 144.
75 See ibid., at ¶ 141.
76 See ibid.
77 See ibid. (emphasis added).
78 Ibid., at ¶ 142 (emphasis added).
79 Ibid., at ¶¶ 144–151.
80 Ibid., at ¶ 144.
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clearly disadvantaged – not merely distinguished – the foreign product.81 The AB
explained: having to ‘establish[] and gradually buil[d] from the ground up’ a ‘new
and separate retail system’ drastically reduced ‘the commercial opportunity to
reach … the same consumers served by the traditional retail channels for domestic
beef’.82 By introducing limitations that effectively restricted US beef access to
consumers, Korea’s imposition of the dual retail system proved detrimental to
imports and thus violated the NT-principle.83
3.1[b] Boiling down Korea–Beef
Since Korea–Beef, the AB has required two conditions be met before finding that a
measure violates GATT Article III:4 or TBT Article 2.1. First, the challenged
measure must discriminate against foreign products because of their foreign origin – but
even such discrimination, if based on legitimate regulatory reasons that do not alter
the conditions of competition, will not trigger disapproval. In the AB’s words:
‘Circumstances like limitation of “side-by-side” comparison and “encouragement” of
consumer perception of “differences” may be simply incidental effects of the dual retail
system without decisive implications for the issue of consistency with Article
III:4’.84 Second, the ‘foreignness-focused’ measure must contain restrictions that
directly reduce import market access by disparately impacting imports relative to the
domestic product.85 The following cases document how the AB administered this
two-step inquiry.
4 POST-KOREA–BEEF NT ANALYSIS
4.1 US–CLOVE CIGARETTES
In US–Clove Cigarettes, the AB reviewed a US ban on flavoured cigarettes that
exempted menthol-flavoured cigarettes.86 Among flavoured cigarettes, the US
industry manufactured mostly menthol cigarettes.87 Indonesian manufacturers
81 Ibid., at ¶¶ 145–148.
82 Ibid., at ¶ 145.
83 Ibid.., at ¶ 147.
84 Ibid., at ¶ 141 (emphasis added). See also US–Tuna II, supra n. 59, at ¶ 225; Appellate Body Report,
Thailand–Customs and Other Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes From the Philippines, ¶ 137, WT/DS371/AB/R
(17 June 2011).
85 See Korea, at ¶ 141; US–Clove Cigarettes, supra n. 59, at ¶ 283 (finding the US’s ban on clove cigarettes
discriminatory because it disparately impacted foreign like products).
86 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), 21 U.S.C. §301, §907(a)(1)(A) (2009); US–Clove
Cigarettes, supra n. 59, at ¶ 168.
87 US–Clove Cigarettes, supra n. 59, at ¶ 223 (‘between 94.3 and 97.4 per cent’ of cigarettes sold in the
United States are domestically produced, and… menthol cigarettes accounted for about 26 per cent of
the total US cigarette market’.).
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produced primarily clove-flavoured cigarettes, and, thus, were directly affected by
the ban.88
The United States argued that the distinction between clove and menthol
cigarettes was not based on clove cigarettes’ foreign provenance. Because a large
segment of cigarette smokers preferred menthol cigarettes, the US argued, banning
menthol cigarettes would cause an unmanageable burden on the US healthcare
system: a large number of consumers would suffer withdrawal symptoms.89
Aware that three domestic brands dominated thementhol cigarette segment – the
one segment exempted from the ban – the AB was skeptical.90 The United States
could not persuade the AB that ostensible concerns with public health – the purported
justification for the flavoured cigarette ban –were in fact legitimate.91 Clearly, the only
explanation for the distinction was clove cigarettes’ foreign origin.92 In this case, both
discrimination by reason of foreignness and disparate impact could not be starker. The US
measure was a ban, which, by construction, discriminated between domestic and foreign
products on the basis of foreign origin.93 Further, without a legitimate regulatory reason, this
ban effectively eliminated imports from the competition, because of their foreignness,
thus having the most disparate impact possible on imports.94
4.2 US–TUNA II
In US–Tuna II, the AB considered a measure that regulated when tuna products
could be labelled ‘dolphin-safe’.95 Specifically, US regulations prohibited produ-
cers who used a ‘setting on’ method of catching tuna from using a ‘dolphin-safe’
label, despite the fact that, in many areas, such method was dolphin-safe, because
the harvesting occurred in dolphin-free waters.96 The AB framed its NT-analysis
under TBT Article 2.1 thusly: (1) whether the measure altered the conditions of
competition to the detriment of the foreign product (i.e., disparate impact); and (2)
whether such adverse impact could be attributed to the imported product’s
foreignness (i.e., discrimination).97
88 Ibid., at ¶ 222.
89 Ibid., at ¶ 225.
90 See ibid., at ¶ 223.
91 Ibid., at ¶ 222–223.
92 See ibid., at ¶ 224.
93 See ibid., at ¶ 222 (stating that the measure disproportionately affected imports, as virtually all non-
menthol flavoured cigarettes were imports).
94 See ibid., at ¶ 220 (upholding the panel’s findings that ‘the disproportionate allocation of costs between
Indonesian and US entities evidence de facto discrimination against imports’.).
95 See Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. §1385 (1985); 50 C.F.R. §216.91;
US–Tuna II, supra n. 59, at ¶ 172
96 16 U.S.C. §1385(c)(2); US–Tuna II, supra n. 59, at ¶ 172.
97 US–Tuna II, supra n. 59, at ¶ 231.
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In its disparate impact analysis, the AB first noted that the ‘dolphin-safe’ label
effectively bestowed an advantage: consumers favoured tuna products where such
label appeared.98 Because the measure controlling access to that advantage arbitrarily
established discriminatory criteria, the AB concluded the measure was detrimental to the
foreign product.99 Domestic harvesters, operating in dolphin-populated waters, had
access to the preferred label because they complied with regulations requiring dol-
phin-safe harvesting methods, yet foreign harvesters, operating in dolphin-free waters,
would be denied access to the label – and thus the greater consumer appeal –100merely
because they used the then harmless setting-onmethod.101 Thus, the disparate regulatory
distinction between domestic and foreign tuna products could not be explained by the
measure’s ostensible purpose – protecting dolphins – because banning the ‘setting-on
method’ in dolphin-free waters did not advance that purpose.102
Finally, the case for discrimination was even more straightforward. Because
US officials could not point to a legitimate reason for the measure’s detrimental
impact on dolphin-safe-caught, Mexican tuna, such impact could only be attributed
to the product’s foreign provenance, which, under the prevailing AB analysis,
amounted to discrimination.103
4.3 GATT/TBT JURISPRUDENCE ESTABLISHED THE PARAMETERS FOR ANALYSIS
OF LABELING MEASURES IN US–COOL
The above cases demonstrate that, prior to US–COOL, the AB had settled on a
uniform test for determining NT violations. In US–Clove, the regulation was
deemed a violation because it disparately affected foreign cigarettes and such
impact could only be explained by clove cigarettes’ foreignness.104 The alleged
clove/menthol distinction was not a legitimate health reason. In US–Tuna II, it
was not enough to detect detrimental impacts on imports; the AB also had to find
that the labeling distinction could not be justified by a legitimate regulatory reason:
a preferred ‘dolphin-safe’ label was denied to tuna whose capture had not imposed
harm to dolphins only because it was foreign.105 Similarly, in Korea–Beef, the
measure’s ‘flaw’ was not the imposition of a domestic/foreign, segregated distribu-
98 Ibid., at ¶ 233 (the panel agreed with complainant that the label was an advantage—a finding not
appealed before the AB).
99 Ibid., at ¶ 298.
100 Ibid., at ¶ 291.
101 Ibid., at ¶ 297.
102 See ibid., at ¶ 297.
103 US–Tuna II, supra n. 59, at ¶ 298.
104 US–Clove Cigarettes, supra n. 59, at ¶ 222.
105 US–Tuna II, supra n. 59, at ¶ 226.
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tion system,106 but the concurrence of such differentiation with detrimental
impacts to imported beef’s distribution and sale that could not be justified by any
alternative, legitimate regulatory reason.107
5 COOL MEETS A NOVEL AB INTERPRETATION
OF THE NT-PRINCIPLE
As explained earlier, the COOL measure required all retailers to display country-
of-origin labels regardless of a product’s origin (i.e., domestic or otherwise).108
Presumably, any adverse or positive impact on foreign products would be the
result of consumer responses to product origin information, which, would be
transmitted upstream to domestic processors and other market participants. As
such, origin information could lead to greater trade volumes for some countries
or losses for others.
5.1 NT-ANALYSIS IN US–COOL
5.1[a] Panel Analysis
In US–COOL, the panel and AB focused on different aspects of the parties’
arguments. Before the panel, Complainants argued that the Interim COOL mea-
sure incentivized meat processors to run batches consisting solely of domestic
livestock because processors could comply more efficiently with record-keeping
requirements if they segregated their facilities.109 Complainants argued, and the
panel agreed, that such incentive ‘affected the conditions of competition in the US
market to the detriment of imported livestock’.110
The United States countered that, unlike the Korea–Beef measure, Interim
COOL did not mandate producers, distributors or retailers to choose between
imported and domestic products.111 Any change in livestock preference would
merely reflect consumer and processor preferences, which would be incorporated
as ordinary ‘private business decisions’.112 The panel disagreed. It found Interim
COOL imposed a legal choice, because it ‘does not allow non-compliance’ in its
106 See Korea–Beef, supra n. 62, at ¶ 141 and discussion supra s. 2.1[a][ii].
107 See ibid., at ¶¶ 148, 172.
108 See 7 C.F.R. 65, § 65.300(a) (2009).
109 See US–COOL (Panel), supra n. 15, at ¶ 7.370.
110 Ibid., at ¶ 7.372.
111 See ibid., at ¶ 7.386 (‘The United States argues that the COOL measure does not create a legal
necessity for differential and less favourable treatment; if individual market participants happen to
process predominantly Label A meat, that is due to their private business decisions’.) (citations
omitted).
112 See ibid.
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requirement to provide COOL information to consumers.113 The panel
‘explained’: ‘the COOL measure itself makes [tracking product according to
country of origin] more costly than other business scenarios’, i.e., not tracking.114
To the panel, requiring tracking information was problematic because it imposed
compliance costs that, once factored into business decisions, affected trade
volumes.
That Interim COOL applied to both domestic and imported beef, without
distinction, did not matter. The panel noted that, prior to Interim COOL,
domestic and foreign livestock were processed together in greater volumes.115 It
interpreted the further segregation of feedlots and processor batches – in response
to business assessment of costs in tracking domestic and foreign product – to be
Interim COOL’s fatal flaw: ‘[i]t is the COOL measure, and not solely the private
decisions of market participants, that has had a decisive impact in changing this
pattern [of integration], by creating an economic incentive to process exclusively
domestic livestock’.116 Thus, fixating on declining trade volumes, without con-
sidering alternative explanations, the panel imputed discriminatory intent to an
otherwise neutral, disclosure measure.
5.1[b] AB Analysis
Before appealing, the United States introduced the Final COOL Rule (henceforth
‘COOL’), containing changes that effectively reduced processors’ record-keeping
costs by simplifying requirements regarding commingling of foreign and domestic
batches.117 With diminished segregation effects, the argument for disparate impact
became less compelling for Complainants. Accordingly, Complainants adjusted
their focus from disparate impact – i.e., criticism that the measure led processors
to reduce production of mixed batches in response to increasing compliance
costs – to discrimination – i.e., criticism that the measure’s record-keeping burden
was discriminatory and unjustifiably arbitrary, because it could not stem ‘exclu-
sively from a legitimate regulatory distinction’.118
Like the panel, the AB, without considering alternative explanations, attrib-
uted the decline in import volumes to relative changes in record-keeping costs that
disfavoured demand for imports.119 The impact of COOL’s record-keeping costs
113 Ibid., at ¶ 7.391.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid., at ¶ 7.387.
116 Ibid., at ¶ 7.391
117 See supra n. 27–30 and accompanying text.
118 See US–COOL, supra n. 1, at ¶ 271.
119 Ibid., at ¶ 349.
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was unjustifiably discriminatory because: (1) the COOL labels available to consumers
conveyed ‘far less detailed and accurate’ information than was actually ‘required to
be tracked and transmitted by … producers and processors’120; and (2) processors
were required to track COOL information for products that were exempted or
excluded from COOL requirements, such as food service-oriented or processed
foods.121 According to the AB, if the measure had actually intended to provide
consumers with comprehensive and accurate COOL information, then it should
have required COOL labeling for processed and restaurant foods and provided
consumers more detailed and accurate information. Without pondering whether
requiring such detailed information to consumers would be desirable or whether
increasing COOL’s scope to other products or market segments would actually
reduce any adverse impact to imported livestock,122 the AB conclusorily deter-
mined that only discrimination could account for the measure’s differential record-
keeping costs in the muscle-cut meat segment.123
Turning to disparate impact, the AB upheld the panel’s view that COOL’s
record-keeping burdens had in fact incentivized segregation to the detriment of
imports.124 The AB referred to the panel finding that processors had reduced the
burden of record-keeping and verification requirements by processing at a given
time only single-origin livestock.125 In light of ‘the particular circumstances of the
US market’, this compliance strategy led to segregating livestock by country of
origin.126 Such segregation, the AB found, harmed the foreign product because
foreign beef could not be supplied in commercially viable processing volumes.127
That, in turn, led processors to prefer US-origin beef and pork livestock, due to
their greater, on-tap availability in higher volumes.128 In sum, the AB took
domestic processors’ cost-reducing, compliance strategy – beef segregation by
country of origin – and its alleged consequence – reduction of import flows – as
120 See ibid.
121 See ibid., at ¶¶ 344 & 349 and 7 C.F.R. 65, § 65.300(b)–(c).
122 A later compliance panel and the AB eventually engaged in the same criticism, though employing
another novel analysis. See Art. 21.5 Appellate Body Report, United States–Certain Country of Origin
Labeling (COOL) Requirements, ¶¶ 5.1, 5.18, WT/DS384/AB/RW; WT/DS386/AB/RW (May 18
May 2015).
123 See US–COOL, supra n. 1, at ¶ 349 (stating the lack of legitimate explanation of COOL requirements
constitutes discrimination).




127 In a footnote, the AB acknowledged that ‘livestock imports are small in comparison to domestic
livestock production, such that US demand cannot be satisfied with exclusively foreign livestock, and
because US livestock are often geographically closer to US domestic markets than imported livestock’.
Ibid., at n. 678 (citation omitted).
128 Ibid., at ¶ 345.
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proof of a detrimental impact attributable to COOL, establishing, thus, the
grounds for an NT violation.129
5.2 A PRECEDENT-CONSISTENT CRITIQUE OF THE AB’S DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS
The AB’s disparate impact analysis is flawed for at least two reasons. First, it is
premised on the exaggerated assertion that COOL incentivized processors to
handle US livestock over foreign livestock. While COOL may have resulted in
marginally higher record-keeping costs for producers who commingled domestic
and imported meat, meatpackers processing single-country-origin, domestic or
imported livestock for immediate slaughter bore the same compliance costs.130 In
the particular case of commingled beef, other than requiring information on
origin, COOL did not impose any further requirement. Regulators even allowed
facilities processing both US and foreign batches separately, on the same day, to
bypass further record-keeping by simply using the commingled label category.131
Finding favouritism under such circumstances illustrates the distorted view the AB
adopted of the regulatory process that resulted in the COOL rules.
Second, despite acknowledging two structural reasons why processing US
livestock is generally more economical – namely, (1) foreign producers’ inability
to meet US demand; and (2) the geographical proximity of US supply to proces-
sing facilities132 – neither of which having a nexus with COOL – the AB went on
to confuse these particular features of the US market with the operation of COOL,
imputing solely to the latter the rise in costs for processing foreign livestock.
Yet, ceteris paribus, meatpackers normally chose to process domestic livestock
because imports could not meet domestic volume requirements.133 Indeed, as
demonstrated in Section 1.2[b], the significant decline in the Canadian cattle
herd constrained Canadian cattlemen’s ability to export in the economically
feasible scales favoured by US meatpackers. The decline in Canadian export
capacity also explains why, despite a decline in consumer demand,134 Mexican
imports actually increased during the early COOL implementation period.135
129 Ibid., at ¶ 349.
130 See Informa Economics, supra n. 42, at 8 (noting that the costs associated with tracking livestock origin
through the processing stage would be avoided by segregation).
131 The regulators viewed this compromise as a method of reducing processor costs and not disturbing
import trade flows. See Joel L. Greene, Cong. Research Serv., RS22955, Country-of-Origin Labeling
for Foods and the WTO Trade Dispute on Meat Labeling 5 (2015).
132 US–COOL, supra n. 1, at n.678.
133 See Informa Economics, supra n. 42, at 9.
134 See supra s. 1.2[b] and accompanying n. 57
135 See supra s. 1.2[b] and accompanying n. 49.
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Clearly, COOL was about providing country-of-origin information to con-
sumers, not restricting foreign producers’ trade flows or altering conditions of
competition.136 Private actors eventually ran separate production batches because
the lower immediate availability of the foreign product made complying with the
disclosure regulations more costly. Viewed in this light, compliance costs may have
enhanced market effects at the margin; they did not, however, change conditions
of competition or become a fundamental cause of imports’ inability to compete in
the US market under neutral, disclosure rules.
5.3 A PRECEDENT-CONSISTENT CRITIQUE OF THE AB’S DISCRIMINATION ANALYSIS
Like its disparate impact analysis, AB’s discrimination analysis is equivocated on two
grounds. First, it fails to establish that the ‘disparate impact’ on imports occurred by
reason of their foreign origin, the requisite element for a finding of discrimination.
Second, it deems COOL as unjustifiably discriminatory by applying an ex post, record-
keeping/labeling commensurability test that disregards the national regulator’s goal
of providing consumers information on meat origin while minimizing compliance
costs. This new test is not only unreasonably non-deferential, but, if heeded, would
require complicated labels that would (1) confuse consumers; (2) be costlier to
processors; and (3) be much more difficult for national agencies to administer.
5.3[a] Pre-US–COOL Rulings Establish that Discrimination Must
Be Found by Reason of Foreignness
As pre-US–COOL cases demonstrate, a NT violation requires tracing any untoward
treatment of imports to their foreign origin.137 Mere detection of over-inclusive,
under-inclusive or burdensome requirements will not lead to a discrimination find-
ing, when such requirements apply regardless of foreign or domestic origin.138 That
136 The AB and panel would consider the measure’s objective intent when it evaluated COOL under
TBT Art. 2.2. See US–COOL, supra n. 1, at ¶ 410. For brevity reasons, this article does not offer a
critique of the AB review of this issue.
137 See, e.g., US-Tuna II, supra n. 59, at ¶ 231.
138 See, e.g., Dominican Republic–Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/
DS302/AB/R (25 Apr. 2005), ¶ 96 [hereinafter ‘Dominican Republic–Measures’] (the existence of a
detrimental effect on a given imported product resulting from a [domestic] measure does not
necessarily imply that this measure accords less favorable treatment to imports if the detrimental effect
is explained by factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product’); accord European
Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 100, WT/DS135/AB/R (¶
100, WT/DS135/AB/R (25 Mar. 2012) (stating, in dicta, that ‘a Member may draw distinctions
between products which have been found to be “like,” without, for this reason alone, according to the
group of “like” imported products “less favorable treatment” than that accorded to the group of “like”
domestic products’.).
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GATT or, in this case, TBT impose no further constraints on how Members pursue
regulatory objectives through labeling or other measures affecting trade beyond non-
discrimination is firmly established in trade literature as well.139
For instance, take the less defensible, flagrantly protectionist fact pattern in
Korea–Beef. The creation of a dual distribution system based solely on a product’s
foreign origin was not sufficient for the AB to find discrimination. Had the dual
distribution system been merely incidental to the challenged measure (i.e., the
result of market forces) – thus, not dictated by regulations that effectively fore-
closed access of imported beef to the older, established distribution system – the
AB would not have found that system discriminatory. The AB explained: ‘We are
not holding that a dual or parallel distribution system … is unlawful under Article
III:4 of the GATT 1994’.140 Unlike the outcome of a government-commandeered
distribution system for foreign beef, the lower immediate availability of foreign
beef in the United States was a feature of the market – one that pre-existed COOL
implementation (see Figure 1) and influenced US meatpackers’ calculus that it was
more cost effective to process single-origin batches (i.e., domestic or foreign) over
mixed batches.
Similarly, the challenged measure in US–Clove Cigarettes was adjudged dis-
criminatory not because it created a distinction without justification, but because it
banned a category of products consisting almost entirely of imports.141 Finally, in
US–Tuna II, the AB found the challenged measure discriminatory not because it
refused a desirable label to imports, but because it did so after targeting an
innocuous harvesting practice employed by foreign producers.142 In sum, these
cases stand for the principle that, to find discrimination, adjudicators must find
more than a burden on foreign producers. Adjudicators must establish that a
burden occurs by reason of the imported product’s foreign origin. In other words,
the challenged measure is discriminatory because it targets the import because of its
foreignness.
5.3[b] AB’s Undue Focus on a ‘Perfect’ Measure Ignored Compromises
that Made COOL a Legitimate Regulatory Undertaking
Having found COOL to be discriminatory, the AB considered whether the
objective of providing country-of-origin information to consumers constituted a
139 See, e.g., Henrik Horn & Petros Mavroidis, To B(TA) or Not to B(TA)? On the Legality and Desirability
of Border Tax Adjustments from a Trade Perspective, 34 World Economy1911, 1919 (2011) (‘what matters
is whether [a measure] is applied in non-discriminatory manner’.).
140 See Korea–Beef, supra n. 62, at ¶ 149 and discussion in s. 4.4 infra.
141 US–Clove, at ¶ 200.
142 See US–Tuna II, supra n. 59, at ¶ 286.
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‘relevant [i.e., legitimate] regulatory distinction[]’143 that justified its perceived
deviation from TBT Article 2.1’s anti-discrimination requirement.144 To the
AB, COOL’s stated objective was not perfectly reflected in its labels,145 because
label categories did not convey specific information as to where each different
production step had occurred.146 Because of this so-called mismatch, the AB found
the measure did not have a ‘legitimate regulatory’ purpose capable of justifying the
alleged discrimination.147
While troubling news for those who will have to defend national, neutral
regulations in Geneva, the AB’s rejection of COOL on grounds of being ‘confusing’
to consumers148 demonstrates a willingness to seize on COOL’s imperfections only
to distort its greater purpose.149 Take the comment that the ‘B’ (i.e., mixed-origin)
label did not indicate where production steps took place, nor accurately reflected
information on a product’s origin, because it allowed identifying as commingled,
‘exclusively US[-]origin beef’150 that had been produced in a facility processing
foreign beef (separately) the same day.151 To the panel and AB, this label ‘conveye[d]
confusing information to consumers’ and revealed a method of regulation that was
not ‘even handed’.152 However, this particular use of the ‘B’ label constituted an
attempt at balancing consumer interest in having meat-origin information against
reducing processor compliance costs – a regulatory compromise that did not necessarily
favour domestic beef and may have even helped foreign beef (i.e., in this limited use
of the ‘B’ label, imports would receive the same label as ‘domestics’).153
Clearly, requiring origin-tracking information for domestic and foreign meat
was not about providing the most accurate information, but the most accurate
information with a view to making compliance costs reasonable.154 Consumers got more
143 US–COOL, supra n. 1, at ¶ 341.
144 The reader should recall that COOL required disclosure of three production steps (i.e., born; raised;
and slaughtered) with four categories of labels (i.e., A (solely US beef), B (imported for immediate
slaughter in the United States); C (mixed origin); and D (solely foreign origin)). See supra s. 1.2[a] and
ns. 33–36. s. I.
145 Ibid., at ¶ 343.
146 Ibid., at ¶ 344 (‘COOL … requires the labels to list the country or countries of origin, but does not
require the labels to mention production steps at all’.)
147 See ¶ 349.
148 See ¶ 343.
149 Indeed, the AB would later characterize COOL’s pro-consumer purpose as ‘secondary’ in its TBT Art.
2.2 analysis. See ibid., at ¶ 410.
150 See ibid., at ¶ 343.
151 See ibid., at ¶ 246 n. 399 (explaining that ‘it was possible to label Category A meat as if it were
Category B meat, even without commingling’.) (emphasis in the original).
152 See ibid., at¶ 345.
153 See supra n. 131.
154 See Under Secretary of Agriculture Bruce Knight, USDA Officials Discuss Country of Origin Labeling
Implementation with Reporters (30 Sept. 2008) (‘[W]e have tried to find that right balance, provide
the information that the consumers are desiring, limit the regulatory burden, but meet the intent and
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information than in the past, while meatpackers—80% of which are importers—
mitigated costs. Clearly, the AB’s ex post, record-keeping/labeling commensur-
ability test was blind to these goals, finding unjustified arbitrariness in the national
regulator’s attempt to reduce industry costs.
5.4 SYNTHESIS
Unlike Korea–Beef, US labeling regulations did not impose a segregated distribu-
tion system for meat products.155 COOL allowed the comingling of domestic
and foreign products. Its only regulatory burden was tracking origin for purposes
of labeling. That US processors would subsequently prefer running separate
domestic and foreign batches—and, thus, produce less commingled batches—
was an incidental decision, grounded on their own private assessment of costs in
view of market realities. Reflecting due deference to Member discretion, the AB,
in Korea–Beef, went out of its way to explain the outer limit of its discrimination
inquiry, a limit that would expressly foreclose a finding of discrimination in US–
COOL:
We are not holding that a dual or parallel distribution system that is not imposed
directly or indirectly by law or governmental regulation, but is rather solely the result
of private entrepreneurs acting on their own calculations of comparative costs and
benefits of differentiated distribution systems, is unlawful under Article III:4 of the
GATT 1994.156
Obviously, COOL marginally increased record-keeping costs to all products,
domestic and imports. Due to market forces, this made imports less desirable in
some applications, not due to their foreignness, but due to the higher cost of
processing product in lower, on-tap availability. Borrowing from Korea–Beef,
private entrepreneurs acted, indeed, ‘on their own calculations of comparative
costs and benefits’, in contemplation of market signals. If the statement that GATT
Article III:4 jurisprudence provides ‘relevant guidance for interpreting … [TBT]
Article 2.1’157 means what it says, one cannot reconcile US–COOL with AB
precedent, certainly not with Korea–Beef.
letter of the law’.); http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdamediafb?contentid=2008/10/0249.
xml&printable=true&contentidonly=true.
155 Instead, the measure had some flexibility that actually encouraged comingled distribution. See 7 C.F.
R. §§ 65.300(e),(g).
156 Korea–Beef, supra n. 62, at ¶ 149.
157 US–COOL, supra n. 1, at ¶ 269; see also US–COOL (Panel), supra n. 15, at ¶ 7.275 (‘Hence, we have
concluded that Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 provides relevant context for interpreting Article 2.1 of
the TBT Agreement – in particular, for interpreting the term “treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin’).
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6 US–COOL AFTERMATH158
The Dispute Settlement Body adopted AB’s COOL report on 23 July 2012.159
Following USDA labeling revisions,160 Canada and Mexico challenged the new
measure as failing ‘to address the lack of correspondence between the recordkeep-
ing and verification requirements and the limited information conveyed to
consumers’.161 As before, the (compliance) panel and AB agreed with
Complainants, construing shortcomings in some COOL labels as discriminatory,
deviating, again, from established NT analysis under GATT Article III:4 and TBT
Article 2.1.162
Canada and Mexico filed separate requests for retaliation163 in the amounts of
USD 2.41 billion/year and USD 713 million/year, respectively.164 Partially
accepting US substantive and methodological objections to the proposed level of
retaliation,165 the arbitrator authorized suspension of concessions for Canada and
Mexico in the amounts of USD 781.77 million/year and 227.76 million/year,
respectively.166 To avoid retaliation, the US Congress acted swiftly and repealed
the provisions requiring country-of-origin labeling for beef and pork in a last-
158 For a full discussion of the subsequent stages in US-COOL adjudication see Juscelino F. Colares,
Gaming the System and Weakening the Administrative State: How Foreign Industry and Domestic Importers
Used WTO Review to Destroy Country-of-Origin Labeling and Accomplish What They Couldn’t in Federal
Courts, unpublished forthcoming manuscript, to be available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/
AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=522749.
159 WTO, DSB Meeting, WT/DSB/M/320, Agenda Item 6, ¶ 110.
160 See Final Rule onMandatory COOL Labeling, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,367 (24 May 2013) (codified at 7 C.F.R.
pt. 65, § 65.300-500 (2014)).
161 See Integrated Executive Summary of the Argument of Canada, at ¶¶ 29 & 30 US–COOL (Art. 21.5
Panel), WT/DS384/RW/Add.1, WT/DS386/RW/Add.1 (Annex B-1) [hereinafter Canada
Compliance Argument]; Integrated Executive Summary of the Argument of Mexico, at ¶¶ 38 & 39
US–COOL (Art. 21.5 Panel), WT/DS384/RW/Add.1, WT/DS386/RW/Add.1 (Annex B-2) [here-
inafter Mexico Compliance Argument].
162 See Panel Reports, US–COOL (Art. 21.5 Panel), ¶ 8.3 & 8.4; Appellate Body Reports, United States–
Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) Requirements (Art. 21.5–Canada and Mexico), ¶¶ 6.2 &6.4,
WT/DS384/AB/RW, WT/DS386/AB/RW ( 18 May 2015) [hereinafter US–COOL (Art. 21.5
AB)].
163 Arbitrator Decision, United States–Certain Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) Requirements (Article
22.6–Canada and Mexico), ¶¶ 1.5 & 1.6, WT/DS384/ARB, WT/DS386/ARB (7 Dec. 2015) [here-
inafter US–COOL (Arb.)].
164 SeeWritten Submission of the United States of America at ¶ 1, US–COOL (Arb.) (30 July 2015), https://
ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Issue_Areas/Enforcement/DS/Pending/US.Sub1.%28DS384%29.
Public.pdf [hereinafter US Written Sub. (Arb.)].
165 See ibid., at ¶ 15 and Executive Summary of the United States of America, at ¶ 33, US–COOL (Arb.)
(15 Oct. 2015), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Issue_Areas/Enforcement/WTO/Pending/
US.Exec.Summ.fin.%28Public%29.pdf [hereinafter US Exec. Summ. (Arb.)]. For a full discussion of
the US proposal see Colares supra n. 158.
166 See US–COOL (Arb.), supra n. 163, at ¶ 7.1 (reporting levels of retaliation in Canadian dollars (for
Canada) and in US dollars for Mexico).
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minute omnibus appropriations bill.167 President Obama signed the bill into law
on 18 December 2015.168
7 CONCLUSION
The TBT specifically recognizes ‘no country should be prevented from taking
measures necessary’ to accomplish legitimate regulatory goals.169 Subject to the
TBT provisions against discrimination and unnecessary restrictions on trade, WTO
adjudicators have acknowledged country-of-origin labeling as a legitimate regula-
tory objective.170 Members do enjoy a certain ‘policy space’ in setting their
regulatory objectives.171
The US–COOL Complainants argued, and the AB agreed, that TBT Article
2.1 proscribed COOL because some US processors and retailers decided to handle
solely domestic product in certain applications, to the detriment of foreign pro-
ducts. This article highlighted the AB decision in Korea–Beef172 and demonstrated
that, in US–COOL, the AB was only able to find discrimination by mechanically
(and unjustifiably) imputing the incidental choices of private actors to the govern-
ment of the United States, with no regard to the distinction between what the
measure effectively required and how private parties came to internalize its costs in
light of market realities.
If the goal of the TBT Agreement is to balance Members’ regulatory freedom
against the interest in free trade, then it stands to reason that only regulations that
unduly restrict international trade should be set aside. US–COOL is thus an
important case because it changes where the line is drawn in this debate. Under
prior GATT Article III:4/TBT Article 2.1 jurisprudence, the AB required that the
contested measure itself directly or indirectly cause the restriction of competitive
opportunities for the imported product, and that such restriction occur by reason
of a product’s foreignness.
Under US–COOL, however, the AB focused only on the occurrence of
impacts detrimental to foreign products, regardless of whether such effects resulted
from individual private actors adapting compliance strategies to market conditions
167 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113, § 759, 129 Stat. 2242, __ (not yet
published by the Government Printing Office) (amending Agricultural Marketing Act, 7 U.S.C. 1638,
§ 1638(1)(A) (1948)).
168 See Signed Legislation, WhiteHouse.Gov, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/signed-legisla
tion (last visited 3 Mar. 2016).
169 TBT Agreement at Preamble.
170 US–COOL (Panel), supra n. 15, at ¶¶ 7.641, 7.650.
171 Ibid., at ¶7.649.
172 See Korea–Beef, supra n. 62, at ¶ 149 (‘We are not holding a dual or parallel distribution system … is
[necessarily] unlawful under Art. III:4 of GATT 1994’.).
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or merely responding to protectionist mandates. Thus conceived, US–COOL
imputes to Members the responsibility for voluntary decisions of private
actors. Clearly, US–COOL severely curtails Member regulatory sovereignty to
impose non-protectionist, pro-consumer choice labeling requirements. And while
US-COOL does not foreclose voluntary (as opposed to mandatory) labeling, the
reality of consumer purchasing habits is that the absence of mandatory labeling will
leave consumers uninformed about the origin of some of the beef and pork they
purchase. One wonders how US–COOL will impact other food labeling regula-
tions in the future and what other administrative measures may be targeted and
struck down next.
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